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ALL IN THE FAMILY: THE APPOINTMENT OF EMPERORS 
DESIGNATE IN THE SECOND CENTURY A. D.
By
OLIVIER HEKSTER
The monstrous vices of the son have cast a shade on the purity of the father’s 
virtues. It has been objected to Marcus, that he sacrificed the happiness of 
millions to a fond partiality for a worthless boy; and that he chose a successor 
in his own family, rather than in the republic.1
Gibbon famously described the period of the so-called adoptive emperors as 
the happiest for the human race. He ascribed this bliss to a number of just 
rulers, whom he assumed had come to power through a conscious system of 
adoption, with childless emperors being free to choose anyone they deemed 
worthy as their successors. That perception keeps lingering on. Michael 
Rostovtzeff s adoptive emperors were exempla of virtuousness, putting the 
welfare of the state over their paternal love: ‘In his family life the emperor 
had to disregard his love for his own children; he had to look for the best 
man among his peers and raise him to the throne by adoption’.2 Likewise, 
Pierre Grimal argued that it was Marcus’ own emphasis on family and 
human warmth (φ ιλοστοργία) that led him to appoint his son Commodus 
as his successor, thus implying a positive choice, rather than an unavoidable 
act.3 Most recently Richard Reece once more echoed Gibbon:
By the second century AD the family principle of the first emperor Augustus 
(27 BC - AD 14), had given way to a principle of adoption ... The dynastic 
principle wormed its way back into the system with the marriage of Marcus 
Aurelius to the daughter of Antoninus Pius, Faustina II. The dynastic 
principle immediately demonstrated its faults when their son, Commodus 
(180-192) proclaimed himself as the reincarnation of Hercules.4
1 E. Gibbon, The History o f  the Decline and Fall o f  the Roman Empire (1776), chap. 4.
2 M. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History o f  the Roman Empire (Oxford 19572), 122.
3 P. Grimal, Marc Aurele (Paris 1991), 216. Cf. D. Baharal, The Victory o f  Propaganda. The Dynastic 
Aspect o f  the Severan's Imperial Propaganda. The Literary and Archaeological Evidence (193-235 
AD) (Oxford 1996), 14: 'This era is also known as the rule of the adopted emperors ... During his 
lifetime each emperor chose the person whom he considered the wisest, most capable and most 
suitable to be his heir, adopting him as his son regardless of family ties'.
4 R. Reece, The Later Roman Empire. An Archaeology AD 150-600 (Stroud 1999), 163.
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The above authors denied the importance of a dynastic principle in a 
particular period of the Principate. Egon Flaig goes even further. In the last 
few years he has repeatedly tried to call the entire idea of a principle of 
dynastic succession into doubt. Flaig argues vehemently against such a 
principle, which according to him consistently failed to function properly in 
periods of crisis, and thus did not exist:
Ein dynastisches ‘Prinzip’ konnte daher nun so lange ‘wirken’, wenn 
ebenkeine Usurpation erfolgte oder erfolgreich war. Das heißt, er versagte im 
Ernstfall. Aber der Ernstfall ist die Probe darauf, welche politischen 
Beziehungen wirken und welche nicht. Folglich war das dynastische 
‘Prinzip’ in der römischen Monarchie -  zumindest in der Prinzipatepoche -  
wirkungslos und damit inexistent.5
This argument is flawed. Systems that do not work still can, and very often 
do, exist. The fact that dynastic factors were not always decisive in extreme 
circumstances -  that they only worked till a usurpation removed the present 
ruling house -  does not mean they were absent. Numerous examples can 
illustrate as much. In Britain a revolution caused the dynastic claims o f the 
House of Stuart to fall short, after which they were duly replaced by the 
House of Hannover -  now the house of Windsor. Here too, dynastic claims 
failed in an extreme situation. Yet nobody would claim the dynastic principle 
was absent from the British monarchy. Just because a dynasty is occasionally 
replaced, does not mean dynastic succession is ‘inexistent’.
One may well agree with Flaig that there was no organ in the Roman 
state that could confer legitimacy on a de facto ruler; that the Principate was 
essentially an acceptance system, not one founded on constitutional 
legitimacy. But this does not disallow the existence of a dynastic principle. 
There are few, if any, situations in Roman history, in which dynastic claims 
were ignored. Which factors caused Claudius to come to power, other than 
his Julio-Claudian blood? Why was Claudius Pompeianus, a Syrian of 
relatively obscure origins, believed to have been offered the empire twice -  
first by Pertinax after Commodus’ death, and later when Didius Julianus 
asked him to be co-emperor -  if not for the fact that Lucilla, Marcus’ eldest
5 E. Flaig, ‘Für eine Konzeptionalisierung der Usurpation im Spätrömischen Reich’, in: F. Paschoud/J. 
Szidat (eds.), Usurpationen in der Spätantike. Historia Einzelschriften 11 (Stuttgart 1997), 15-34; 20. 
Cf. Idem, Den Kaiser herausfordern. Die Usurpation im Römischen Reich (Frankfurt-New York 
1992).
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daughter, and Lucius Verus’ widow, was his wife?6 Even an imperial 
candidate like Galba, whose ‘links with the Julio-Claudians were so tenuous 
as to be worthless in terms of loyalty’, still tried to make what he could of 
those links, strongly emphasising his links with Livia, putting her head on 
coins and calling himself ‘Lucius Livius Galba’ in at least one official 
document.7 The systematic slaughter o f members of the imperial family by 
reigning emperors further shows the perception that close relatives were a 
liability that could endanger one’s own position.8 In Andrew Lintott’s words: 
‘Did not dynastic connections in themselves confer, if not legitimacy, 
acceptability?’9
The adoption of Trajan by Nerva appears to be the one instance in which 
dynastic connections did not operate. On this occasion family ties did not 
rule supreme. Nerva apparently actually passed over relatives in order to 
adopt his successor (Cassius Dio, 68.4.1), though they ‘were so unimportant 
we do not even know their names’ -  let alone what happened to them after 
Trajan came to power.10 In any case, the circumstances surrounding Trajan’s 
adoption were suspect. Nerva’s authority had proved to be not all- 
encompassing, forcing the elderly emperor to punish Domitian’s killers 
against his own will." With the threat of anarchy, and an alleged break-up in 
army discipline (Pliny, Panegyric 6.2: Corrupta est disciplina castrorum), it 
should come as no surprise that the childless Nerva chose to adopt the 
governor of Upper Germany, a man of distinguished background and career
6 IGR 1.1509; SHA, Marcus Aurelius 20.6-7; Herodian, 1.8.3; SHA, Pertinax 4.11; SHA, Julianus 
8.3; M. L. Astarita, Avidio Cassio (Rome 1983), 75-6 n. 60, 110; G. Alföldy, Konsulat und 
Senatorenstand unter den Antoninen. Prosopographische Untersuchungen zur senatorischen 
Führungsschicht (Bonn 1977), 184. T. Hölscher, ‘Claudische Staatsdenkmäler in Rom und Italien. 
Neue Schritte zur Festigung des Principats’, in: V. M. Strocka, Die Regierungszeit des Kaisers 
Claudius (41-54 n.Chr.). Umbruch oder Episode (Mainz 1994), 91-105; 93, 103.
7 BMC I, nos. 201-2, PI. 58.4; SEG 15.873: ‘A ow io u  A ißiou <E>eßaoToti < S > o i)À t t ik îo u  TccAßa’ 
[= M. McCrum/A. G. Woodhead, Select Documents o f  the Principates o f  the Flavian Emperors 
(Cambridge 1961), no. 328]. Cf. also the behaviour of Nymphidius Sabinus, who started to spread 
rumours that he was Gaius’ illegitimate son, the moment he began ‘to think of himself as potentially 
more than a kingmaker’; Th. Wiedemann, ‘From Nero to Vespasian’, in A.K. Bowman, et. al., eds., 
Cambridge Ancient History X2(= CAH X2 ) [Cambridge 1996], 256-82; 261-2.
8 M. Corbier, ‘La Maison des Césars’, in: P. Bonté (ed.), Epouser au plus proche. Inceste, prohibitions 
et stratégies matrimoniales autour de la Méditerranée (Paris 1994), 243-91 ; 274-5, with references.
9 A. Lintott, ‘The Emperor and his Army’, Classical Review, new series XLIV (1994), 130-2; 131.
10 R. M. Geer, ‘Second Thoughts on the Imperial Succession from Nerva to Commodus’, Transactions 
and Proceedings o f  the American Philological Association 67 (1936), 47-54; 49. On Nerva: PIR2 
(1936), no. 1227.
11 Cassius Dio, 68.3.3; Pliny, Panegyric 6.1-3.
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-  and the general whose troops could reach Rome most rapidly, if he so 
desired.
One should also remember that there had not been much time for 
people to get used to Nerva -  nor to develop dynastic sentiments towards 
any o f his relatives. Trajan’s adoption was, in many respects, extraordinary, 
and more like a self-imposed usurpation than standard succession. Quite how 
extraordinary is made clear by Pliny, who in his Panegyric to Trajan of AD 
100, states that this is indeed a hitherto unheard way to become emperor.12 
Pliny puts a positive turn on affairs, unsurprising for someone presenting a 
panegyric in the emperor’s presence.
No tie of kinship or relationship bound adopted and adopter; your only bond 
was that of mutual excellence, rendering you worthy either to choose or be 
chosen .. Nor is there a more fitting way to adopt a son, if the adopter is the 
princeps .. If he is destined to rule all, he must be chosen from all .. Not to 
adopt someone, who in the eyes of all could have proved a ruler even without 
adoption, would indicate the wanton tyranny of power.13
An anti-dynastic speech indeed, constructing an entire new system of 
government. Then again, Pliny could hardly have told' Trajan anything else 
to his face. To use it as evidence for common senatorial ideas as to how 
succession should be arranged, is pushing the argument too far.14 Only a few 
* years later Dio Chrysostom accentuated the importance of relatives, and the
fact that one inevitably had to take their positions into account:
And should not the ties of blood and kinship be especially dear to a good 
king? For he regards his kith and kin as a part of his own soul, and sees to it 
that they shall not only have a share of what is called the king’s felicity, but 
much more, that they shall be thought worthy to be partners in his authority 
... and those kinsmen who live honourable lives he loves beyond all others, 
but those who do not so live he considers, not friends, but relatives. For other
12 Pliny, Panegyric 7.1: ‘O novum atque inauditum ad principatum iterV
13 Ibidem 7.4-7: ‘Nulla adoptati cum eo qui adoptabat cognatio, nulla necessitudo, nisi quod uterque 
optimus erat, dignusque alter eligi alter eligere .. Nec decet aliter filium  adsumi, si adsumatur a 
principe .. Imperaturus omnibus eligi debet ex omnibus .. Superbum istud et regium, nisi adoptes eum 
quern conste imperaturum fuisse, etiamsi non adoptesses’. Cf. Tacitus, Histories, 1.15, where Galba’s 
adoption of Piso, another choice outside of the family (without an alternative within the family at 
hand) in a situation of crisis is presented as break for the better: ‘Sed Augustus in domo successorum 
quaesivit, ego in re publica'. Galba’s speech has many similarities to Panegyric, 7-8.
14 H. Nesselhauf, ‘Die Adoption des römischen Kaisers’, Hermes 83 (1955), All-92·, ‘..damals gängige 
Gedanken...’.
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friends he may cast off when he has discovered something objectionable in 
them, but in the case of his kinsmen, he cannot dissolve the tie; but whatever 
their character, he must allow the title to be used.15
Trajan, though no kinsman of Nerva, was still adopted before becoming 
emperor-designate, like all emperors without sons adopted their preferred 
successors, presenting them, in effect, as a son-by-law. This, at the most 
banal of levels, could be used as evidence to support the claim that 
throughout the principate (including the period of the adoptive emperors) 
succession was a dynastic affair. Yet even when there was no son to succeed, 
the emperor was in no way free to choose any successor he saw fit. 
Succession in the second century, under the so-called system of adoptive 
emperors, may appear to have been a simple choice for the best man 
amongst the emperor’ peers, but those peers, out of necessity, had to belong 
to an exclusive group of imperial relatives.
Indeed, ignoring a relative could be dangerous. Those with imperial 
blood could be the natural focus-point for any who were discontented with a 
current ruler. An insurrection against an emperor was deemed to be far easier 
if an imperial relative would lead it. Often members of the imperial family 
were popular among the troops, sometimes also those fallen from favour.16 
Even if  one wants to see, e.g., Tacitus’ description of Tiberius’ fear o f a 
possible insurrection by Germanicus as mainly a literary invention, it would 
still be an invention along lines that the audience Tacitus was writing for 
could have believed in. A rebellion led (or at least endorsed) by a kinsman of 
the emperor was thought of as a possibility. Without such a leader, it was 
almost unthinkable that a rebellion could succeed. As Timpe showed years 
ago, the military, in particular, strongly supported the idea of a ruling family, 
and would form an immense obstacle to any non-relative who would claim 
the supreme power.17 Though this did not inevitably mean that the nearest 
member of the family would succeed, it did imply the near-impossibility of a
15 Dio Chrysostom, Peri Basileias 3.119-21.
16 G. Rowe, Omnis spes futura paternae stationis: public responses to the Roman imperial succession 
(DPhil; Oxford 1997), 174 [forthcoming as: Princes and Political Cultures: The New Senatorial 
Decrees from  the reign o f  Tiberius (University of Michigan Press)].
17 Tacitus, Histories 3.38; Tacitus, Annals 1.42, and especially 2.76: ‘..penitus infixus in Caesares 
amor praevaleret'. Cf. Ammianus Marcellinus, 26.7.10, 16. D. Timpe, Untersuchungen zur 
Kontinuität des frühen Prinzipats (Wiesbaden 1962), 88: ‘Aus diesem Grund ist er επ ιε ικ ή ς , weil und 
indem er aus βα σ ιλ ικόν γένος ist’.; J. Lendon, Empire o f  Honour. The Art o f  Government in the 
Roman World (Oxford 1997), 254: ‘Soldiers felt a strong dynastic loyalty’.
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non family member taking preference over a relative. Elagabalus’ alleged 
dynastic claims as Caracalla’s son still earned him the support of the military 
in AD 218, and when their loyalty to him diminished, they transferred it to 
his adoptive-son Severus Alexander, who was also his cousin by blood.18 The 
succession to Claudius by Nero is a clear example of an adopted, slightly 
more remote, family member taking preference over Claudius’ natural son 
Britannicus. The fact that the military seem to have supported Nero does not, 
however, imply the lack of dynastic favouritism on their part that Flaig 
argues for.19 Nero was, of course, as much as Britannicus -  if  not more than 
he -  a member of the Julio-Claudian house. He was also adopted at a rather 
young age, the natural son of the reigning emperor’s wife, and married to 
Claudius’ daughter Octavia. Even more importantly, Nero was the great- 
grandson o f Augustus himself, and closely related to the still immensely 
popular Germanicus, whereas the only alternative to the throne -  Britannicus
-  was also under age. The support of the armies is therefore in no way 
comparable to that for a mere ‘citizen’ against an heir of the blood.
Earlier, the succession to the murdered Caligula had already shown 
the preference for a dynastic emperor on the part of, at any rate, the 
Praetorian guard. The discussion after Caligula’s death (and, notably, that of 
his baby daughter, who was murdered along with him) had not so much been 
whether a member of the dynasty was to be the new princeps, but which. The 
Praetorians had recognised Claudius’ possessio of the Julio-Claudian estate, 
and thus his status as head of the Julio-Claudian House. This made it 
difficult, if  not impossible, for the Senate to accept the claims put forward by 
Marcus Vinicius, who was also intrinsically connected to the ruling 
dynasty.20
Likewise, the plebs preferred the ruling house -  and the stability it brought -  
over estranged usurpers. One could, rightfully, argue that the popularity of 
members of the Domus Augusta had much to do with the fact that they were 
the sole benefactors of the brilliant glory of the triumph, and, from Domitian 
onwards, the only ones who could please the populace with games and 
spectacles.21 Yet this limitation of audience-pleasing in itself denotes the
18 Cassius Dio, 79.14.1-2, 79.34.4; Herodian, 5.3.10; 5.4.2-4; SHA, Macrinus 9.4; 14.2; 15.2; SHA, 
Elagabalus 1.4.
19 Tacitus, Annals 12.69; Flaig 1992, op.cit. (n. 5), 203; M. Griffin, Nero. The end o f  a dynasty 
(London 1984), 33.
20 Th. Wiedemann, ‘Tiberius to Nero’, CAH X 2, 198-255; 231.
21 Cassius Dio, 54.2.4; Suetonius, Domitian, 4.1.
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unwillingness to let power and popularity escape the boundaries of the 
imperial house.
A Roman house was, however, ‘not a natural thing, but a deliberate 
construction, fashioned through marriages and adoptions and exclusions of 
undesirables’.22 Thus, one could suggest, outsiders could be adopted into the 
dynasty, and ‘natural’ successors passed over, creating a ‘dynastic system’ 
which was as dynastic as the Empire was still the Republic. But though 
deliberately constructed, rules had to be obeyed. Adoption might seem an 
almost perfect way to make those who were suitable to rule through their 
qualities part of the ruling family, but there was always tradition to take 
account of. Jane Gardner notes how in Roman society ‘A definite preference 
is shown for adopting persons related by blood, or at least by marriage, 
where any are available’. Similarly, Corbier has stated that ‘the choice o f the 
adopted heir was normally made from amongst the closest relations: either 
consanguineals (paternal or maternal) or relations by marriage’.23 To adopt 
someone when there was a close male relative -  let alone a son -  in the 
familia already, would be noted, and possibly criticised, as Tacitus makes 
implicitly clear:
He [i.e. Augustus] ordered Tiberius to adopt [Germanicus], though there was
already an adult son in Tiberius’ house24
There were even those who kept track of the distinguished houses that had 
an ‘undiluted’ line of succession.25 From that point of view, Claudius’ 
adoption of Nero was an aberration -  outstanding as Nero’s ancestry may 
have been. It is again Tacitus who points out that:
22 Rowe 1997, op.cit. (n. 16), 3. Cf. F. Millar, ‘Ovid and the domus Augusta: Rome seen from Tomoi’, 
Journal o f  Roman Studies 83 (1993), 1-17; 17: ‘.. an Imperial ‘family’ which was itself a succession of 
constructions’.
23 J. Gardner, Family and Familia in Roman Law and Life (Oxford 1998), 115; M. Corbier, ‘Divorce 
and Adoption as Familial Strategies’, in: B. Rawson (ed.), Marriage, Divorce, and Children in Ancient 
Rome (Oxford 1991), 49-79; 67.
24 Tacitus, Annals, 1.3: '..per adoptionem a Tiberio iussit, quamquam esset in domo Tiberii filius  
iuvenis..'. Cf. Corbier 1991, op.cit. (n. 23), 66: ‘The criticism seems perfectly understandable: the 
adoption seemed pointless, even suspicious, when the main obligation of head of the family, the 
transmission of name and possessions, was already assured’. See also Tacitus, Annals 2.43: ‘Tiberius 
ut proprium et sui sanguinis Drusum fovebat'.
25 R. P. Sailer, ‘Familia, Domus, and the Roman conception of the family’, Phoenix 38 (1984), 336- 
55; 351: ‘For all Romans the domus was closely related to wives, children, and other relatives. For 
aristocrats it was also associated in a concrete way with lineage, for which it could stand as a symbol’.
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It was noted by the experts that, prior to this [Claudius’ adoption of Nero], 
there was no trace of an adoption in the patrician branch of the Claudian 
house, which had lasted without interruption from Attus Clausus downward26
If  only for reasons of snobbery, prestige, and tradition, one would do well to 
keep adoption, and hence -  in case of the imperial house -  succession to the 
supreme position, within the family. Loyalty from the part of the army and 
the people which was rooted in dynastic considerations formed an added 
reason -  and one that should not be underestimated -  to adopt an heir who 
was dynastically related anyhow. This was indeed what second-century 
emperors did.
Trajan was Hadrian’s father’s first cousin. After the latter’s death, Trajan 
became Hadrian’s guardian. Hadrian’s wife was Vibia Sabina -  Trajan’s 
grandniece. The two probably married soon after Trajan’s accession.27 This 
wedding, like most royal weddings, must have been a public event. An 
occasion ‘which embodied or provided opportunities for dynastic 
pronouncements’.28 The title Augusta, bestowed on Vibia’s mother and 
grandmother in AD 107, only further emphasised the dynastic importance of 
the union.29
To phrase family relations in terms o f inheritance: ‘Had Trajan been 
a private citizen who had died intestate, his property would have been 
distributed between Hadrian’s wife, and her unmarried sister. If  they had 
refused, Hadrian and his sister Domitia Paulina would have been the 
beneficiaries. Hadrian was thus the natural heir to any property of such a 
nature that a woman could not acquire it’.30
Not all second-century emperors were quite so unproblematically dynastic in 
appointing heirs. Hadrian’s measures to facilitate succession remain, at first 
look, somewhat enigmatic. The announcement of Lucius Ceionius 
Commodus as his heir in AD 136 raises a number of questions. They could 
all be solved by Carcopino’s wonderfully romantic notion of Ceionius as 
Hadrian’s bastard son, whose existence could only be disclosed after Vibia
26 Tacitus, Annals 12.25: ‘Adnotabant periti nullam antehac adoptionem inter patricios Claudios 
reperiri, eosque ab Atto Clauso continuos duravisse'.
27 Geer 1936,op.cit. (n. 10), 50.
28 Rowe 1997, op.cit. (n. 16), 27, though he was talking of the Julio-Claudian period.
29 CIL XI 1333; CIG 2576-7.
30 Geer 1936, op.cit. (n.10), 50 n. 12.
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Sabina’s death earlier in AD 136.31 It could be true, of course, though it 
seems somewhat unlikely that the unknown author of the Historia Augusta 
would have missed gossip of quite such outrageous extravagancy. As it is, he 
has come up with a spectacularly scandalous theory of his own; Commodus’ 
personal beauty was the sole reason for his election. Sir Ronald Syme 
suggested remorse, from Hadrian’s side, for the execution of Avidius 
Nigrinus, Ceionius Commodus’ stepfather, and father-in-law, as reason for 
the surprising choice.32
Anthony Birley answered the question ‘why this man’, by arguing 
that Hadrian was already trying to make the young Marcus Aurelius, who 
was related to him, a strong candidate for an eventual emperorship.33 Marcus 
had been married at Hadrian’s wish to Ceionia Fabia, one of Ceionius 
Commodus’ daughters. Commodus was tubercular, and was not likely to 
reign for long. Since his own son was only five years old, the 15-year-old 
Marcus would have been a strong contestant for succession.34 This argument 
is strengthened by Antoninus Pius’ ensuing rise to power. Antoninus was, of 
course, Marcus’ uncle, and Hadrian made Antoninus adopt his nephew, and 
Lucius Verus.35 Marcus’ bond to the now-dead Ceionius Commodus was 
dissolved; the betrothal to Ceionia Fabia was broken off, only to be replaced 
by a marriage to Faustina Minor -  Antoninus’ daughter.36 Those with 
stronger dynastic claims to succeed Hadrian than Marcus on his own would 
have had (i.e. Hadrian’s 90-year-old brother-in-law Julius Servianus, and the 
latter’s grandson Pedanius Fuscus Salinator), were forced to commit 
suicide.37 It should also be observed that two kinsmen of Marcus, C. 
Ummidius Quadratus and L. Catilius Severus, fell out of favour with
31 J. Carcopino, ‘L’hérédité dynastique chez les Antonins’, Revue des Etudes anciennes, 51 (3-4) 
(1949), 262-312. For the dissemination of the image of Ceionius Commodus as intended successor, 
see now: J. M. H0jte, ‘The epigraphic evidence concerning portrait statues of L. Aelius Caesar’, 
Zeitschrift fiir  Papyrologie und Epigraphik 127 (1999), 217-38. For a refutation of Carcopino’s notion: 
R. Syme, ‘Ummidius Quadratus, capax imperii', Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 82 (1979), 
287-310 = Roman Studies III (Oxford 1984), 1158-1178; 1170-1.
32 SHA, Hadrian 23.8-11 ; Cassius Dio, 69.17.1; CILXIV 2112 (=ILS 7212); PIR2 C 605; A.R. Birley, 
Marcus Aurelius. A Biography (London 19872), 233; R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford 1958), 601.
33 On Marcus’ kinship to Hadrian, see Cassius Dio, 6.21.2, which states that Hadrian preferred Marcus 
Aurelius over Lucius Verus amongst other reasons, ‘on account o f his kinship’.
34 A.R. Birley, Hadrian: The Restless Emperor (London-New York 1997), 289-90. Further 
bibliography and sources can be found in Birley 1987, op.cit. (n. 32), appendix 2, ‘The Antonine 
Dynasty’, 232-48.
35 Birley 1997, op.cit. (n. 34), 295-6.
36 SHA, Marcus Aurelius 6.2. Cf. SHA, Verus 2.4; Marcus Aurelius, Meditations 1.17.2; 1.17.7.
37 SHA, Hadrian 23.1-3, 7-9; 15.8; 25.8; Cassius Dio, 69.17.1-3.
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Hadrian in the emperor’s last year. This ‘surely suggests the possibility of 
competition for the role of placeholder for Marcus’.38
This implicit, essentially dynastic, choice of Marcus Aurelius, would 
portray Antoninus Pius as a mere temporary solution -  a sort of stop-gap 
emperor.39 But, at the same time, it also strengthened Antoninus’ position. 
By adopting Marcus Aurelius, Antoninus Pius created a dynastic claim to the 
throne of his own. He was the father and father-in-law of someone who was
-  although by no means directly -  a member of the current ruling house. 
This dynastic web of power also safeguarded stability. Though the 52-year- 
old Antoninus had no children of his own, an easy succession was assured; 
after Faustina Minor had first given birth, even for two generations to come. 
Walter Ameling noted in this context: ‘Kinder (..) garantierten den 
Fortbestand der Dynastie und damit die politische Stabilität des Reiches. 
Eine eindeutige, sichere Regelung der Nachfolge erreichte man am 
leichtesten durch die Übertragung der Macht auf einen Sohn’ .40
One should not fail to mention, here, the family-tree devised by 
Ginette di Vita-Evrard, in which she argues for direct kinship -  though by no 
means close -  between Antoninus Pius and Hadrian.41 Though ties of blood 
between Hadrian and his successor would not further clarify the earlier 
choice for Ceionius Commodus (indeed, one could argue that they obscure 
the motives for this choice even further: in appointing Commodus, Hadrian 
would have ignored a candidate who appears to have been a family 
member), they would, once more, imply underlying dynastic considerations.
Behind the facade of a system of adoption, dynastic interests loomed large. 
These interests only became more noticeable as time went on. It is surely no 
accident that in the third century Rome saw child-emperors for the first time 
in her history. Little wonder, then, that when Commodus survived his 
childhood, his father made him the obvious emperor-to-be. Only once, in the
38 Birley 1987, op.cit. (n. 32), 240.
39 This notion of a ‘stop-gap’ emperor (often a son-in-law) can also be applied to Tiberius, though he, 
of course, survived his intended successor.
40 W. Ameling, ‘Die Kinder des Marc Aurel und die Bildnistypen der Faustina Minor’, Zeitschrift fü r  
Papyrologie und Epigraphik 90 (1992), 147-66; 147.
41 G. di Vita-Evrard, ‘Des Calvisii Rusones à Licinius Sura’, Mélanges de 1'Ecole française de Rome 
(Antiquité) 99 (1987), 281-338; Eadem, ‘La famille de l ’empereur: Pour de nouveaux "Mémoires 
d ’Hadrien"’, in: J. Charles-Gaffiot/H. Lavagne (eds.), Hadrien.Trésors d ’une villa impériale (Milan 
1999), 26-36; 32. Discussed by M.-Th. Raepsaet-Charlier, ‘Nouvelles recherches sur les femmes 
sénatoriales du Haut - empire romain’, Klio 75 (1993), 257-71; 263-4. I am grateful to Mme. 
Raepsaet-Charlier for drawing my attention to this genealogy.
entire history of Rome, did reigning fathers ignore their sons when 
appointing successors. Maxentius and Constantine, sons of the Tetrarchs 
Maximian and Constantius, instantly showed why it had not been tried 
before, and the ensuing wars only ended with Constantine’s eventual victory. 
Marcus did not risk as much, and kept to the dynastic principle, as his 
predecessors had done before him.
The offers to Ti. Claudius Pompeianus to take on the empire after 
Commodus’ death, or partake in its rule, would, if  true, show how deeply 
this principle was imbedded in Roman tradition. Pompeianus had retired 
from politics after a failed attempt to assassinate the emperor Commodus in 
AD 182/3 had involved several people close to him, though not himself. The 
conspiracy by Pompeianus’ wife Lucilla and his brother’s son Claudius 
Pompeianus Quintianus (who was also Lucilla’s son-in-law through 
marriage to her daughter by Lucius Veras), once more showed the danger of 
imperial relatives.42 According to the Historia Augusta, Pertinax, who was 
indebted to Ti. Claudius Pompeianus for much of his career, called his old 
patron back to Rome and offered him the supreme position. Cassius Dio, 
though, who was present when Pompeianus returned to Rome, does not 
mention such an offer in any way. Nor is there further evidence to support 
the claim that Didius Julianus had asked Pompeianus to ‘share the empire 
with him’.43 Yet even if  he was not offered the supreme position, he was 
apparently still considered a serious candidate for it.
The importance attached to dynastic considerations also seems to 
have been the cause for much o f the hostility surrounding Marcus Aurelius’ 
surviving ‘relatives’. The gentes that through marriage connections had been 
allied to either Lucius Verus or Marcus have been expertly traced by H.-G. 
Pflaum.44 He noted that whenever any of those whose lineage could be 
followed back to either of the two Augusti showed any political ambition 
whatsoever, calamity struck, often instigated by the reigning emperor. Thus, 
Commodus killed off ‘toute la gens des Petronii Surae Mamertini’, who were 
connected to Commodus’ sister Comificia, in AD 190.45 M. Peducaeus
42 Cassius Dio, 73.4.4-6; Herodian, 1.8.3-6; SHA, Commodus 4.1-4; F. Grosso, La lotta politica al 
tempo di Commodo (Torino 1964), 148; PIR 6 (1998), 248, stemma 26, shows a family tree o f the 
Claudii Pompeiani. For Ti. Claudius Pompeianus: PIR 2 (1936), no. 973; Claudius Pompeianus 
Quintianus: PIR 2 (1936) , no. 975; Lucilla: PIR 1 (1933), no. 707.
43 SHA, Pertinax 4.11; SHA, Julianus 8.3; Cassius Dio, 74.3.1-2; Grosso 1964, op.cit. (n. 42), 110 
(n.2 for further references). See for Pertinax’ career: CIL XI 5743.
44 H. G. Pflaum, ‘Les Gendres de Marc-Aurele’, Journal des Savants (1961), 28-41, with a family tree 
between pp. 42-3.
45 Pflaum 1961, op.cit. (n. 44), 40; 36-7.
45
Plautius Quintillus, husband to Fadilla, another sister of Commodus, 
survived Commodus’ reign, but was killed, in his turn, by Septimius Severus 
in AD 205.46 Younger generations down the imperial bloodline were not safe 
either. Ti. Cl. Aurelius Pompeianus, son of Ti. Claudius Pompeianus and 
Lucilla, was killed by Caracalla, shortly after Geta had been murdered.47 The 
list goes on. Of all the gentes that had sons marrying daughters of Marcus 
Aurelius, only the Claudii Severi stayed out of harm’s way. That might have 
had to do with the premature death, preceding that of Marcus himself, of 
Anna Galeria Aurelia Faustina, who had married Cn. Claudius Severus. It 
seems, however, more probable to presuppose that their being undisturbed 
was a direct result of the fact that Tes membres de cette famille eurent la 
prudence de ne montrer aucune ambition politique et de séjouner la plupart 
du temps dans leurs propriétés d’ Asie Mineure’.48 It was wise to publicly 
take a distance from political ambitions for those with imperial blood in their 
veins, however diluted.
One important aspect of imperial succession has not yet been touched upon -  
the transference of the imperial possessions. These possessions were more 
magnificent in the second century than ever before, and their transfer from 
one emperor to the next already made it almost impossible for Marcus 
Aurelius to ignore Commodus when designating his successor. The immense 
property, which had accumulated ever since Augustus, in effect allowed the 
emperor to govern the realm. As Fergus Millar put it: ‘the possession of 
private wealth by the emperor, the various means which he deployed to 
increase it at the expense of some of his subjects, and the endless stream of 
gifts and liberalities in cash and kind which he conferred on others, were all 
fundamental elements in the nature of his regime, and were basic to the 
setting and style of his life, and to the pattern of his relations with his 
subjects’.49 The imperial treasures were, occasionally, even put on display. 
Herodian recounts how Commodus exhibited the imperial wealth during a 
procession for the mother of the gods -  apparently common practice at that 
particular festival:
46 Pflaum 1961, op.cit. (n. 44), 35.
47 Pflaum 1961, op.cit. (n. 44), 33. Cf. P.M.M. Leunissen, Konsuln und Konsulare in der Zeit von 
Commodus bis Severus Alexander (180-235 n. Chr.) (Amsterdam 1989), 202.
48 Pflaum 1961, op.cit. (n. 44), 41; 29-31.
49 F. Millar, The Emperor in the Roman World (London 19922), 201.
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All the tokens of people’s wealth and the treasures of the imperial house -  
things of marvellous material and workmanship -  are paraded in honour of 
the goddess.50
The question of whether this wealth was, legally speaking, ‘private’ or 
‘public’ property -  a question with major repercussions for the mode of 
transference of possessions from one emperor to another -  has been the 
cause of heated debate, most prominently between Fergus Millar and Peter 
Brunt.51 Ultimately it appears impossible to solve. However, even if  the bulk 
of the possessions may effectively have gone with the job, part of them were 
also perceived to belong to the family. Pliny, in his Panegyric shows how -  
at least to the public eye -  the private property of the emperor (fiscus) is still 
seen as separate from the treasury (aerarium), during the reign of Trajan:
It may be thought that you are less strict in your control of the fiscus than of 
the treasury {aerarium), but in fact you are all the stricter through believing 
that you have a freer hand to deal with your own money than with the 
public’s.52
Whereas Ulpian stated that:
For the property of the fiscus is, as it were, the private property of the 
emperor.53
An automatic transference of the entire patrimonium from one emperor to 
another is, furthermore, contradicted by passages in the Historia Augusta, 
which explicitly state how Hadrian and Antoninus Pius drew up wills for, at
50 Herodian, 1.10, 5. Cf. Herodian, 5.6, 8.
51 O f the utmost importance in the debate: F. Millar, ‘The fiscus in the first two centuries’, Journal o f  
Roman Studies 53 (1963), 29-42; Idem, ‘The aerarium and its officials under the empire’, Journal o f  
Roman Studies 54 (1964), 33-40; Idem 1992, op.cit. (n. 49), 175-201; P.A. Brunt, ‘The ‘Fiscus’ and its 
Development’, Journal o f  Roman Studies 56 (1966), 75-91 (=Roman Imperial Themes [Oxford 1990], 
Ch. 7, 134-162); Idem, ‘Remarks on the Imperial Fiscus’, Liverpool Classical Monthly 9/1 (1984), 2-4 
(=Roman Imperial Themes, op.cit., Ch. 16, 347-353); B. Levick, ‘Caesar omnia habet. Property and 
Politics under the Principate’, in: A. Giovannini/D. van Berchem, edd., Opposition et resistances a 
VEmpire d ‘Auguste a Trajan (Geneva 1986), 187-212.
52 Pliny, Panegyric 36.3: ’At fortasse non eadem severitate fiscum qua aerarium cohibes: immo tanto 
maiore quanto plus tibi licere de tuo quam de publico credis’.
53 Dig. 43.8.2.4: ‘Res enim fiscales quasipropriae etprivataeprincipis sunt'. Note, however, that this 
passage has been interpreted diametrically opposed by E. Lo Cascio, Annali del Istituto per gli Studi 
Storici 3 (1971/2), 55ff., and P.A. Brunt. As Brunt himself put it (‘Remarks’ 1984, op.cit. [n. 51], 3 = 
‘Remarks’ 1990, op.cit. [n.51], 351 ): ‘.. no consensus will ever be reached on its implications’.
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least, part of their patrimonium.54 Unreliable a source as the Historia may be, 
these passages do show a perception of the imperial possessions as being 
linked, at least partly, to the imperial family, rather than just to the job.
This perception alone made it nearly impossible for Marcus to 
exclude Commodus as his heir. He could of course have adopted somebody 
else, and as in Roman law there was no legal distinction between adopted 
children and those bom in lawful marriage, the adopted son would have had 
exactly the same rights as the natural one.55 Yet this would not in itself have 
taken the rights o f natural sons away. In order to exclude Commodus from 
his will, Marcus would have had to expressly disinherit him, otherwise the 
will became void.56 Even after explicit disherison, Commodus could still 
have challenged the law as ‘undutiful’.57 Such a course of action might have 
appeared justified to a large part of the populace, as ‘society generally held 
that children should inherit -  that disinheritance was to be avoided’.58 When 
there was no son, a paterfamilias was also not entirely free to distribute his 
wealth as he saw fit. Many relatives could challenge a will, if  they had been 
excluded, or sometimes just forgotten, and they could do so for a period of 
up to five years.59 Though this could strengthen the case for dynastic 
considerations (if a near male relative was adopted, there would be a person 
less to challenge the will), the argument should not be pushed too far. The 
chances of anyone actually suing against the explicit wishes of a reigning 
emperor were minimal, if  not absent. A final legal issue which can be taken 
into consideration is the loyalty of imperial freedmen, which was officially 
also part of the inheritance.60 However, the freedmen at the court seem to 
have placed their loyalty with whomever was in charge, rather than anyone 
else.
Similarly, Septimius Severus’ retroactive adoption into the Antonine 
family in AD 197 might be seen in terms of inheritance. One could argue
54 SHA, Hadrian 24.1-2; SHA, Antoninus Pius 7.9-10; 12.8. For the use of ‘patrimonium’ in the 
ancient world see Millar 1992, op.cit. (n. 49), 625-7.
55 Gardner 1998, op.cit. (n. 23), 117.
56 Justinian, Institutiones 2.13, pr.: ‘sed qui filium in potestate habet, debet curare ut eum heredem 
instituat vel exheredem nominatim facia t’.
57 Justinian, Institutiones 2.18.
58 E. Champlin, Final Judgements. Duty and Emotion in Roman Wills 200 BC - AD 250 (Berkeley-Los 
Angeles-Oxford 1991), 107.
59 Dig. 5.2.1 (Ulpian): ‘omnibus enim tarn parentibus quam liberis de inofficioso licet disputare‘\ 5.2.5 
(Marcellus); 5.2.8.17 (Ulpian); 5.2.9 (Modestinus).
60 Through the ius patronatus. On the freedmen, and their place within the imperial organisation: A. 
Winterling, Aula Caesaris.Studien zur Institutionalisierung des römischen Kaiserhofes in der Zeit von 
Augustus bis Commodus (31 v. Chr. —192 n. Chr.) (München 1999), 23-6.
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that the ‘adoption’ was fuelled by a desire to be the legally correct heir to the 
Antonine wealth.61 But the necessity to form part of an older tradition, to find 
dynastic popularity with the people and the armies, must surely have been of 
greater importance. One should not forget Severus’ famous last words of 
advice to his sons: ‘Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, and scorn all other 
men’.62 Free popularity with the armies must have sounded even better. The 
extent to which Severus disseminated his claim to be divi Commodi frater 
further shows that the dynastic connection was meant to be broadcast to 
several layers of society, not just to learned jurists.63 Eventually Severus 
went so far as to rename Jerusalem as Colionia) Ael(ia) Capiitolina) 
Comm{odiana) P(ia) F{elix), probably on a visit to the region in AD 201.64 
Legal motives can hardly have formed the reason for this striking honour to 
Severus’, now almost ten-year-dead, virtual brother. More probably, 
Septimius Severus was once more legitimating his position by emphasising 
his connection to the previous ruling family. Thus, the last emperor of the 
second century placed himself firmly within a dynastic framework, whilst 
creating a dynasty of his own.*
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61 Severus was, after all, schooled as a jurist. See the article by W.J. Zwalve in this volume.
62 Cassius Dio, 77.15.2: ‘ομονοείτε, τούς στρατιώ τας π λο υ τίζετε , τώ ν άλλω ν πάντω ν 
κ α τα φ ρ ο ν ε ίτε ’.
63 CIL VIII 9317; Cassius Dio 76.7.4; 76.9.4; SHA, Severus, 10.6; 11.3-4.
64 Y. Meshorer, The coinage o f  Aelia Capitolina, (Jerusalem 1989), 60, 62, 84-6 nos. 66-67, 88 nos. 
81-8la; L. Kadman, ‘When was Aelia Capitolina Named ‘Commodiana’ and by whom?’, Israel 
Exploration Journal 9 (1959), 137-40; 140. Grosso, op.cit. (n. 42), 581-4, fig. 3 erroneously ascribes 
this renaming to Pescennius Niger on the basis o f a counterfeit coin.
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